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INTRODUCTION
Funds requested for new rail transit projects m the United States greatly exceed available monies Scarce transit resources must be allocated according to some funding criteria Historically, transit prolect evaluatmn by The Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) has used cost-effectiveness analysis. w~th no d~rect accounting of effects on national economic efficiency The cost-effectweness method estimates fmanclal (not economic) cost per unit project performance (labor cost per tnp, for example) Efficiency analysts measures the change In the net value of national production of goods and services The cost-effectiveness method requires declszon makers to rank projects judgmentally accordmg to two or more noncommensurate criteria It cannot tell us when projects are more efficient than one another and, from an economic efficiency standpoint, cannot identify when a project ts not worth budding at all Analyses of transit projects should evaluate effects on economic efficiency, as well as nonmonetary effect,~ on level of service, lower-income riders, and so cn. Evaluations of water resources projects have estnnated effects on recreatmn travel tlme, rural Incomes, water quality, wddhfe, urban growth, and navigation and flood safety There ~s no reason why benefit-cost analysts cannot also be apphed to transit prolects The chief effects ofthese projects (on travel time, vehicle operation costs, auto acc~dents, pop lutton, and noise) are not more d~fflcult to quantify m economic terms than the effects of large water resources projects Large dams that provide flood con1 rol and municipal water supplies have large-scale effects on the rate and location of urban growth Large port developments affect regtonat urbanizatLon patterns and internatmnal trade Both water resources and rail transit projects can have geographically concentrated costs and benefits, as well as dispersed ones Both types of projects are locally mirrored and are then supported by governors and members of Congress and are generally highly pop tticlzed Many of the chief uncertamnes m transit project evaluation arise m projecting riders by mode and the changes in travel time on alt modes These uncertainties are common to both cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analyses Some additional uncertainty ts introduced by using benefit--cost analysis to estimate the economic values of these direct effects Advances have been made in the last 15 years m such valuation methods, however We argue that the types of analysis methods used by federal water resources development and land management agencies can be adapted by UMTA for the evaluation of transit projects Benefit-cost analys~s was first required m 1902 for water resources project planning In 1932 the rules were strengthened to require that water resources project benefits exceed costs In 1973 the evaluation process was broadened to Include effects on environmental quality and on social well-bemg and it was required that th~s reformation be presented m a set of accounts, together with the efficiency mformatmn (U S Water Resources Council, 1979 Council, , 1983 The 1983 rules require that uncertainty m the data be acknowledged, by usmg ranges for estimates where necessary, and recommend that tradeoffs between economic effimency and other impacts be displayed These rules apply to all federal water resources agencies (Army Corps of Engmeers, Bureau of Reclamahon, F~sh and Wddhfe Serwce, Soil Conservation Service) and land management agencses (Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management) Many other federal agencies use benefit-cost analysts, under their own rules -t *There ~s a manual for the esttmauon of the economic benefits of highway and bus Improvements (Amerlcan Assocmtton of State Highway and Transportation Officm~s, 1977) The Federal Highway Admmlstranon (FHWA) uses benefit-cost analysts m some prolect evaluanons, but the method has not been formahzed m rules The mandate for 317 318 Federal expenditures for transit should (1) evaluated an terms of changes tn national economic efficiency, as well as other Impacts (2) acknowledge uncertainty m the impact estimates, and (3) handle the vanous incommensurable data m an analyucal fashion, preferably wlth an economic breakeven analysts of efficiency vs all other impacts
Outline of paper
First we revtew the transportation evaluation llterature and see that authors advocate both the use of cost~effecttveness and benefit--cost analysts Then we identify the principles of an ideal method and w~th this theoretical framework tn mind review the UMTA project evaluation rules as they have evolved dunng the last 12 years Finally, we recommend changes m UMTA's current procedures This paper adds to the earlier research by tying the theory of evaluation to UMTA's actual methods R A JOHNSTOn and M A DELucm
THE TRANSPORTATION EVALUATION LITERATURE
From the mld-mneteenth century through the 1920s, European and American economists produced pathbreakmg normative analyses of optimal fares, regulations, and investments for vanous modes of transportation These early developments in transportation economics were based on effmency concepts After several decades of relatwe inattention to transportation, economists began tn the 1950s to develop advanced methods of analysts, leading to better estimates of the cost of providing services and of demand for transportation Methods for determmmg efficient levels of pacing and of investment have also been improved (Winston, 1985) There ,s a curious d~chotomy m the American transportatton literature, w,th journal articles on transit evaluation almost uniformly recommendmg cost-effectweness methods but w, th textbooks on transportation planmng tending to advocate the use of both cost-effectweness and economic efficiency measures formalized agency decmon-makmg methods examining economic efficiency and other impacts has been spurred by continuing controversy over porkbarrelmg by Congress and self-serving behavior by agencies For example, Maass (1951) , White (1969), and Young (1978) crmcized the Corps for biasing thear analyses to budd large inefficient projects when smaller, more efficient projects or nonstructural actions, such as water conservauon and floodplain zoning, were possible Loomls (1987) found that the Forest Servace tended to bias their evaluauons toward development alternauves and thereby frequently adopted economically mefficaeat plans Crmques such as these have been generahzed an the theory of pubhc choice economics (Buchanan and Tullock. 1962) , which describes the self-serving motwatmns for agency behavaor Benefit-cost analysts ts more theoretically sound than cost-effecuveness analysts. but entads problems of its own Farst. there ~s the basae analytic assumption that private markets allocate goods efficiently and so we can use market prices to value the goods and services being analyzed The economist must be careful to account for market tmperfecnons, such as subsaches and taxes, externahnes, lrreversabtlmes, psychological services, and so on Methods exist for making these corrections More difficult problems are the correct est,-matron of long-run pace elasucmes and determining the effects of inadequate mformaUon on the part of consumers (M~shan. 1976) Second. setting the socml d~scount rate a matter of concern It is generally agreed that the rate should be somewhat lower than the private opportunity cost of capatal because the public investment is usually less nsky and the risk ts spread much more thinly Congress has set the d~scount rate for water resources and land management evaluations at the rate for long-term Treasury bills For capital mtenswe projects, the analyst may w~sh tn perform a sensmvity analysts of two or three rates of discount For an m-depth d~scusslon of d~scount rate. see Lind et al (I982) ThErd Is the Issue of verttcal and horizontal equity We recommend (below m the text) that equaty (dlstributaon) effects be handled outside of the efficiency account Such an analysis would look at the effects of alternative modes and routes and alternative financing methods on gainers and losers It Is not always feasible to predict actual methods of future financing, however Good reviews of al~ of these assues are found m Mlshan (1976), Musgrave and Musgrave (1973), and Haveman and Margohs (1983) Cost-effectiveness methods Fielding, Glauthler, and Lave (1978) reviewed rune transit performance indicators, all of them cost°ef-fectiveness measures "t Their effectweness radices measure the attainment of various locally set oblectwes, which vary from city to city Capital costs do not figure m any of the measures, a serious problem for funding agencies trying to allocate monies This Impressmn that transit planners have many confhctmg and piecemeal evaluation criteria as reinforced by an international review of transportation program objectwes by Horn (1981) The evaluat,on methods m the nine developed countries reviewed varied widely The author states that performance indicators m metropoh where transit shares range from 2% to 40% need to be tailored to national and local needs Heaton (I980) tmphctty rejects benefit-cost analysts and believes that tt is difficult even to standardize cost-effectweness measures He argues that, within the United States, no single set of indicators should be used to compare transit proposals Several authors report on the difficulty of performing ctty-toc~ty transit project comparisons (McCrosson, 1978 , Underwood, 1979 , Keck, Zernllo, and Schneider, 1980 , Kern, 1982 Stokes (1979) and Talley Anderson (1981) beheve that local objectwes should figure prominently m system comparisons We disagree with these authors wtth regard to UMTA evaluauons and Congressional funding decisions We do not see how natlonai fundmg decisions can be made ?There are three "efficiency" indicators, four effectivehess indicators, and two mdacators that measure both They define efficiency.much more narrowly than do economists, however, and so all nine measures are really cost-effectiveness indicators Evaluauon methods in an efficient or fair fashion without a uniform set of evaluation measures at the core of the analysis The problems of evaluation at the national level with incoherent indicators 1~ illustrated by Deen and Skir~ner (1976) , who comment on two transit system evaluations done under the 1976 UMTA policies (revlewed below), which employed many cost-effectiveness measures "The potential number of such [evaluation] measures Is unhmlted and the use of a large number tends to be duplicative, confusing, and even misleading cost~effectweness cannot be represented by a single measure " (p 63)
Attempts have been made to resolve this problem of too many overlapping measures of system pertormance by selecting smgle cost-effectivenest,, indicators Heaton (1980) states that London Transport uses one indicator to evaluate system ~m-provements, passenger-males per unit of total cost (p 52) Forkenbrock (1984) , in a similar vein, ommends a single effectiveness measure of added pas,,engers per additional dollar These methods have the advantage of resulting in unamb|guous evaluations, but do not directly measure changes in economic efficiency "Ih~s review of transit journals shows that costeffectiveness methods employ surrogate measures. suca as trips, rather than measuring natmnal econoraic efficiency Therefore, the overall economic effects of projects are unknown The lack of theoretical agreement on cost-effectweness measures resulls m widespread d~sagreement over project fundmg There is a need to measure national economic efficiency, so that the effects of transit projects on the national economy can be evaluated and other project effects can be weighed against efficiency
Effictency methods
Texts on transportation planning generally have recommended the measurement of efficiency, together wuh cost-effectweness Kuhn (1965) , for example, states that cost-effectiveness analysis is appropriate for the local evaluation of projects, but that federal expenditures analysts should be based on economic efflctency Specifically, he recommends that net present economzc value be maximized, for any level of annual federal budget We agree with Kuhn Meyer and Strastzhe~m (I971) state that there are generally two objectives for tad transit systems (1) the maximization of net present value and (2) maxlmlzmg the use of the facdlty (pp 230-241) Dickey (i983) agrees that efficiency effects should be measured but states that cost-effectweness measures also need to be used to measure effects on displacement of persons, lower-income riders, air quality and so on We point out, however, that ~t is possible to measure the efficiency effects of all of these factors Meyer and Mdter (1984) recommend the use of costeftectweness techniques m evaluations because of legal requirements to assess impacts on environfor raft transit projects 319 mental quality, displacement, and many other project effects (p 373) They say that cost-effectweness analyses should be tied to community objectives, but that economic welfare measures should be included in the evaluation iFew recent efforts have been made to apply economic efficiency concepts to transit evaluation, even m the academic literature One exception is an efficiency evaluation of an express busway by Gordon and Muretta (1983) They analyze travel time and d~rect cost savings, external costs (congestion and pollutmn), and parking subsidy costs This work Is conceptually correct, but leaves out some external costs, such as subsidies to petroleum, the external cost of umnsured losses of lives and workdays, and the cost of importing oil (DeLuchi, Sperhng, and Johnston, 1987) These textbook authors, then, recommend an evaluation method that generally meets our criteria The ideal method will estimate project effects on national economic efficiency and on noneconomic objectives, such as eqmty Let us briefly examine the economic theory underlying efficiency measures, since they have not been used In rail transit evaluation
PRINCIPLES OF PROJECT EVALUATION

Economw theory
Choices concerning the allocauon of pubhcallp rovided goods, such as rail transit, in theory can be evaluated b~ comparing the economic costs and benefits of the alternatives Generally, the object is to maximize net benefits, measured in dollars Costs and benefits over the hfe of the project are discounted to the year in which the decision is to be made This discount rate reflects soclety's time preference for money and the opportunity cost of capital
The direct costs of transit projects are the projected expenditures for the construction and operation of the facthty Indirect costs are effects such as air and noise pollution, not compensated for by the transit operator Direct benefits are resource, time, and accident savings to existing transit riders and riders diverted from other modes Indirect benefits include savings to riders on other modes Workmg ume Is usually valued at average wage rates and nonworkmg time at half of that value (Prest and Turvey, 1965) Travel demand for the period of analys~s ts scaled upward according to trip projections for the region being studied tThetr discussion of possible cost-effectweness measures bsts over 70 different measures (pp 379-380) Their critique of economic efficiency measures ts puzzhng They state that these measures suffer from (l) "arbztrary deftrattans of costs and benefits" and (2) the d~fftculty of comparing close B/C ratios tP 406) Both of these problems also apply to cost-effectiveness measures 320 Wtlhngness to pay (WTP) is the accepted concept for measuring direct and indirect benefits For most passengers Wq'P is hagher than the fare paid WTP for transit can be estamated from standard travel models WTP for redirect benefits or to eliminate or reduce redirect costs can be measured with the contmgent valuation method (Loomls and Watsh, 1986) Users and nonusers are surveyed to see the highest amounts they would pay to gam benefits or to reduce costs These responses in natural resource and wddhfe surveys have been compared to payments m actual markets and shown to be fairly accurate (Bishop and Heberlem. 1979 , Brookshxre et al, 1982 , Schulze, d'Arge, and Brookshlre, 1981 There are measurement problems, however, and so survey instruments must be carefully desagned with internal checks for bins and estimates should be verified with actual consumer behavior whenever possible (Rowe and Chestnut, 1983) The contingent valuation method as recommended for use by federal water resources. wddhfe, and land management agencms and by the Envaronmental Protectaon Agency m project evaluation (U S Water Resources Council, 1979 I983) If these methods are applied to transit evaluataon for several years, suitable techniques should evolve
Policy evaluatton theory
In addmon to estimating the economac effects of projects, we must also evaluate noneconomlc impacts, such as distributional eqmty, for the analysis to be poimcaily acceptable Impacts can be portrayed along with the economic calculataons m accounts (comparatwe descnptwe tables)
Then one can apply constraints to one or more of the effects and reject alternatives that wdl generate effects beyond these limits In practice, arnbtent mr quality, the protection of htstonc sites and parks, and other ampacts are treated as constraints because of legal standards Next, a breakeven analysis can be performed, whereby the analyst shows how much the intangible effects must be worth in dollars to make us mdtfferent between the most efficient alternative and another one (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978, pp 127-130, Patton and Sawlcka, 1986, pp 271-274) Uncertainty should be acknowledged m the estimates Since probabdaty distributions for the attribute values are not avadable from travel projection models and other methods of estimation, one should use judgmentaUy determined ranges We reviewed ndershlp estamates for recently completed passenger rail systems in North America and found that they are almost always high or low by at least 10% and are often high by 30% or more (Johnston et al, 1987) 5" Gordon and Willson (1984) performed -tOur review of recently started rail systems in North America shows that actual rldersh~p in the first stabilized year was generally lower than predicted The values are [(actual -projected) , actual] Miami -89%, Vancouver -44%. BART -41% Calgary -31%, MARTA, -15%. R A JOHNSTON and M A DELUCHi cross-sectional analys~s of light rail transat (LRT) all crees in the world using regression equations and found that offaclat ndershlp estimates were generally too high Where bins or uncertainty exast, UMTA must correct the estimates to a falr range TMs project evaluation model maxamlzes the use of welfare economics and stall allows for the analytical constderatlon of all project effects Because we believe that federal funding decisions should be based prtmardy on economic efficiency and because we think that many effects can be measured in economic terms, we structure the analysis to examine the tradeoff between efficmncy and all of the other values together
We do not advocate that federal funding decisions be made strictly on the basis of the relatwe efflcmncy of projects, however, only that effIcaency reformation be prominently displayed for UMTA and Congress to consider Declston-mdlng approaches that reduce all effects to efficiency changes suffer from a variety of theoretical and operational probtems (Merkhofer, 1987 ) and so we do not wish to recommend that approach Also, Congress has not enunciated a clear efficiency objectwe for transportation funding, as we will see below, and for us to do so would be technocratic We hope that improving the process of transit evaluation to prommemly feature efficiency effects wdl encourage Congress to fund only the most efficient transit projects tn any given year or at least to require that any project in a given city produce the largest net benefits ¢.
We wdi now describe the UMTA evaluation procedures used m the past and evaluate them against this model
UMTA's PAST EVALUATION METHODS
Before examining the current evaluation method used by UMTA, we will look at their past project evaluataon rules to see ff they satisfy our criteria UMTA's first rules for project evaluation were adopted m 1976 (UMTA, 1976) The method exphcltly used "multiple measures of cost and of levels of effectiveness" (UMTA, 1976, p 41 512) Effectweness was to be measured In terms of "national obJectives"
and "local goais" (UMTA 1976, Cleveland, -13%, Baltimore, +5%, Edmonton, + 13%, and San Diego, +i7% Note that there are s~x systems that overesUmated and three that underestamated and that the overestamates are much h~gher than the underesnmates We averaged the data for lines when there were two hnes (Calgary) and averaged actual rider counts when they were for days and annual counts were not avadable :]:Frankly, ~t seems likely that transit alternatives w~thm cities will often be practically equal m net benefits due to the high degree of uncertainty in rldership estimates and tn other economic estimates and so a single criterion of greatest net benefit may not be useful in reaching decisions Congress ma~ wish to simply reqmre a benefit-cost ratio of 1 2 or greater, as it does with water projects, to eliminate inefficient transit projects, leaving some margin for error and bins
Evaluauon methods for rail transit projects 41 513) No ranked and quantifiable natlonal oh]Pctires were set forth No tnterczty comparisons were perfo~ reed No measures of national efficiency were t~sed
Transportation systems management (TSM) was required as a part of all alternatives (UMTA, 1976 p 41,513) In other words, TSM was held to be always cost-effectwe and the most efficient use of existing facilities in advance of building rail projects Uncertainty was not acknowledged The 1976 UMTA evaluation system did not meet any of our criteria for project analysts In 1978~ UMTA amended the 1976 regulations with a "Policy toward Rail Transit" that stated that fundtl~g would be directed toward "densely populated cities that possess wellodeflned core areas," which would generally mean "older urban centers" (UMTA, 1978. p 9,428) The 1978 policy also stated that, to get federal assistance, localities "will be reqmred to commit themselves" to a financial plan and transit-supporting measures, such as zoning and parking policies near stations and auto restrictions in cel~trai business districts (CBDs) (UMTA. 1978. p 9,J,29) This latter statement seems to set forth two constraints but is vaguely worded With regard to uncertainty in comparing alternatwes, the 1978 UMTA policy stated that "Apphcants wdl be required to show clearly and convincingly the need for partially or fully grade-separated trans,.t service "" (emphasis In original) (UMTA, 1978 p 9 429) This statement implies that if a bus alternative is close on key evaluation attributes to the ~uldeway alternatives, then the bus alternatwe will t)e chosen Uncertainty is handled with a decision rule that places the burden of proof on the proponents of rail alternatives
The 1978 UMTA policy does not meet our criteria for project evaluation, except that there is some recognition of the need to acknowledge uncertainty
Cratque of the apphcatton of the 1978 UMTA method
A case study will dlustrate the weaknesses of the 1978 UMTA method We performed a detailed analysis of the 1983 selection of LRT in Sacramento, Cahtorma (Johnston et al, 1987) No attempt was made in the selection process (performed m 1981) to define economic efficiency or operationahze measure,, of it Many performance m&cators were used, including some local ones of doubtful theoretical vahdity (claimed energy savings and an increase m economic growth)
Because of the many Indicators of merit, the evalUdtlOn process became embroiled in arguments over wht(h m&cators to emphasize UMTA focused attentJ~on on total annual cost per transit passenger (year 2000), an attribute that favored the high occupancy vehicle lane (HOV) alternatlve
The local
TFor doubts see La~e (1978~ on energy and Altshuler ( 1981 ) on economic growth 321 planners touted the year 2000 total O&M cost attribute, which favored LRT All other attributes including year 2000 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost per transit passenger favored HOV There was no clearly dommant alternative, however Uncertainty was not properly handled m the analysis The key locally weighted Indicator, total O&M cost, differed by less than four percent across all of the alternatives Even when we used a techmcally more reahstlc estimate for LRT O&M, the difference was only five percent (In the other direction) Many other attribute values were also clearly within the range of est~matlon error The values for year 2000 O&M cost per passenger were all within 2 3% The total cost per passenger figures were all within ii 1% Estimates that all fail within such ranges are indistinguishable, in our opinion, because of the mabthty to forecast the underlying variables accurately In Sacramento. rldershlp was estimated at 20.500 per weekday and during the first few months of full operation, the actual ridershlp was 10,880 (Sacramento Regional Transit Agency, 1987) Furthermore, the projected cost for the system was $131 million and the actual cost came to $176 million :1:
In the Sacramento case. the city had control over the choice of mode. since the funds were (unused highway) transfer funds So. the evaluation was advisory to the city council Furthermore, local staff members and city councllpersons told us that they did not consider the evaluation procedure to be theoretically sound or very useful m decision making They felt that many of the UMTA ln&cators were arbitrary and that the point estimates of their values were inaccurate The current UMTA evaluation procedure, adopted m 1984. appears to correct some of the problems we found with the previous method, but stdl falls short of the method we propose
TIlE CURRENT UMTA EVALUATION PROCEDURE
The regulations
The 1984 evaluation process does not use national economic efficiency measures It uses cost-effectiveness measures, based on the belief that most per°f ormance measures cannot be valued m economic terms The new method sets constrmnts on a few performance and service area attributes to ehmmate clearly inferior alternatives in the early stages of evaluation After projects pass these fairly generous constraints, local political support attributes enter the analysis
The 1984 Congressional Appropriations Conference Report required UMTA to Include in their evaluation system the followmg project attnbutes (1) cost-effectiveness, (2) local fiscal effort, (3) private sector part~cipation, (4) "the results of alternatives .+It is apparent from statements m the press by decision makers revolved m the Sacramento LRT project and the San Jose LRT project that the ndershtp estimates m both cases were '°h~gh-end guesses ' analysis," (5) participation by &sadvantaged businesses, and (6) local government support (UMTA, 1984a, p 21,285) This direct~on is not much of an advance over past ambiguous Congressional norms We note that Congress did not prohibit UMTA from also using an economic efficiency criterion The first four criteria were combined by UMTA into aggregate system performance and service area attributes The fifth cntenon ts set as a constraint on all projects The last attribute ~s subsumed under cnterm (2) and (3) All alternatives are evaluated at the margin, beyond a basehne of TSM. which mcludes expansion of bus service TSM "should" be included m each alternative, but apparently ts not required (UMTA, 1984a, p 21,290 , col 3) Projects are evaluated segments, one corridor at a time, to prevent overbuilding Locally preferred alternatwes are compared and ranked on an annual basis across all cities This ~s a major advance over past practice where no national comparisons were done There are three steps tn the evaluation process Fixed gmdeway alternatives must pass two threshold tests m the first round of evaluation A corridor must have at least 15.000 daily hnked transit trips and the alternative must have an average annual cost per new r~der of $10 O0 or less for gmdeway or rail projects to be considered The cost ts calculated tn two ways (1) as the sum of annuahzed capital, O&M, and travel time (for existing riders) costs--this Is the "total cost-effectweness (CE)" index. (2) as m (1), with tocal capital costs subtracted--this is the "federal CE" index At this stage, both the total and federal indexes must be less than $10 00 per new rider The $I0 00 is estimated to be three times the national average savmgs to an auto driver dwerted to transit and ts intended to include m&rect benefits These are generous constramts, used to eliminate only clearly non-cost-effectwe projects from further study In step two, three tests must be passed for fixed gmdeway projects to remain under consideration (1) transit ndershlp must increase re|atwe to the TSM alternative, (2) the locally preferred alternatwe must have the lowest cost per new rider of all the local alternatwes, and (3) the project must have annual cost per new rider of $6 00 or less (federal CE) The rationale behind the first two tests ~s one of relative cost-effectweness among local alternatwes The third test ~s a generous absolute nauonal cost-effectiveness constraint
In the third step projects are ranked loosely by the federal and overal "merit" indices into high, medium, and low categories A top rating on both the federal and total measures places an alternative m the h~gh overall category Not being top ranked m either measure places an alternative m the low category The alternatives are not discretely ranked more finely due to uncertainty m the attribute values In an example of uncertainty, total annuaI costs per new rider of $1 50 and $t 60 (13% difference) are considered ~ m&stmgmshabie ' (UMTA, 1984b, R A JOHNSTON and M A DELuCHI p 17) This is a sound pnnciple We are still left, however, with a partitioning problem Classifying the projects into three categories for each merit measure will be arbitrary To improve the ranking of their preferred alternative, local officials may increase the local funding match, which reduces the federal cost per new rider and improves that attribute value Also, an alternative can get a higher ranking if local O&M funds are guaranteed with a tax or other de&cated source To a lesser degree, supportive local zoning, parking, and auto restraint pohctes can also ~mprove a pro lect's rating Except for the local match, these changes in ranking are carried out "judgmentalty " An mcrease m local capital match and the de&cation of local O&M funding sources could be viewed as very crude measures of rider and nonnder WTP, expressed through local polmcal decisions Many other project attributes are locally estimated, as required by transit statutes, the National Env~ronmentaI Pohcy Act (NEPA), and local preferences These attributes do not directly affect the UMTA rankmgs Many of these attributes, such as reductions in air pollution, could be valued in economic terms, however
Crmque
The 1984 procedure appears to employ the new rider as the economic good being produced This procedure assumes that a new rider recewes a benefit of $6 00 or less This measure, based on estimates of the time and operation costs of auto trips, may approximate actual rider W'I'P UMTA, however, does not reqmre the actual measurement of WTP in each city
The pohcy analysts strengths of the 1984 procedure are fewer evaluation criteria, constraint cutoffs set for some of them, uncertainty handled through three stages of evaluation where one constraint is t~ghtened up in the second round~ and the use of one attribute to rank alternatives, also in round two The 1984 procedures appear to be better than the earher process m terms of using one indicator of merit that is, arguably, a sound overall cost-effectiveness measure This coherence of evaluation based primarily on one md~cator could make ~t easier to later proceed to a method employing efficiency evaluation as ~ts primary component Our critique wall identify problems with the existing rules and suggest changes that could be made with th~s procedure that would move ~t toward our model system
The cost-per-new-rider criterion Our main concern is with defining project merit tn terms of lowest cost per new rider, rather than measuring net benefits (the tota~ wdhngness-to-pay of riders and nonnders for the transit system minus total costs) UMTA counts as benefits only direct impacts on mobdity Secondary effects, such as reducing freeway congestion costs, are considered to be proportional to the direct effects m the overall merit measures, and so adding these effects to the merit measure Evaluation methods is thought to not change project rankmgs (with the merit Indicators expressed as ratios) The proposlo t~on tl~at secondary benefits are hnearly related to primary benefits may not be true For example, tad alternatwes may produce secondary benefits, such as reduced diesel smoke and odor and mcreased commumty pnde, that HOV alternatives do not ¢ Gtw~.n the uncertainties of predicting redirect effects (Kmght and Trygg, 1975 , Lave, 1978 , Altshuler, 1981 , Lee, 1981 , UMTA is justified m currently using local capital overmatch as the surrogate measure UMTA, however, should develop methods for predicting these redirect effects more accurately Lee (1981). and Kmght and Trygg (1975) , for example, identify condmons for certain secondary effects to occur Forkenbrock (1984) performed a telephone survey that showed a 2 md property tax for transit was supported because of percewed ~mprovements In air quahty, business, and jobs for poor people Respondents did not place much weight on benefits to themselves as users This survey shows the need for WTP research on potential riders and nonnders UMTA also should perform follow-up studies on the effects of transit improvements on travel costs, air quahty, and moNhtv for nondrwers
The use of a TSM basehne UMTA evalutes rad projects against a TSM baseline so that all alternatwes are compared against a similar low-capital-cost alternatwe This results in several problems, which woulcl be ehmmated ff UMTA evaluated against the statu,, quo One problem is that UMTA reqmres that transit ndership increase for any funded gmdeway attematwe relative to TSM There are two problems with th~s First, it ~s concewable that an efficient transit system could be bruit that had lower total costs and lower ndershlp than TSM Second, the ndersh~p increase reqmrement ~s ennrely msensmve to uncertainty If a rml project cost $1 more than TSM and served one less person, ~t would be chinmated, even though the projects were not stgmficantly different :Ã related problem with the TSM baseline, which may be unavoidable, ~s the lack of specification of the "['SM alternative to assure that tt is efficient An efficient bus system must be included as part of TSM, but 1 here is lots of room for local offlcmls to design an inefficient TSM alternatwe to ~mprove the margmal merit of their rad plan Finally, by measuring the cost-effectweness of rad only relative to TSM, UMTA cannot compare the absolute CE of TSM proposals or the absolute CE of rail projects Ideally, the UMTA would recomme~,d funding the m~x of projects that maxlm~zed net benefits, natmnally +The local governments can pay more of the capital costs for the preferred alternatwe, of course if they strongly beheve that desirable secondary effects wdl occur :[:In the 1985 new tad start project ratings, UMTA recommended the rejectmn of the St Lores Airport LRT Prolect because of a 0 6% decrease m ndersh~p for rat transit prolects 323 Uncertainty and Nas present problems, even though UMTA intends to review the local estimates of costs and ndership But since UMTA has not done a study of actual vs projected riders for completed U S or world rad transit systems, ~t is unclear how they would correct the local ndershlp numbers Also. no definmon ts given of how great the percentage d~fferences can be between rankmgs and have them be treated as slmdar Overall, the 1984 evaluation procedure appears to be an ~mprovement over the 1976 system, but does not meet any of our cntena UMTA's 1986 refinements UMTA issued an advisory manual m 1986 and these guidelines could lead to several improvements In future regulatmns To reduce local fudging on ndershlp estimates, travel models are reviewed and modehng suggestions made Also, trans,t O&M cost categories are standard,zed, for the same reason To ehmmate double-counting, it ~s made clear that land value increases are not a benefit of transit improvements, but are derived from the reductions m trip costs The manual also states that projects can be funded when ndershlp falls ff they are cost-effectwe This ~s a major Improvement The most s~gmficant improvement is the suggested est~matmn of travel benefits using WTP methods based on data from travel models This WTP data is not required, however, and does not feed into the actual evaluation Other improvements m measurement include defining time costs more accurately estimating the external effects of the alternatzves rather than assuming that they are proportional to d~rect effects, and recommending a standard method for local WTP surveys We hope that these recommendations become reqmred practice m the future, as they move toward our ideal method by measurmg changes in effioency
The gmdehnes make for less accurate evaluations m several ways Time discounting ts dropped for both benefits and costs The opposite approach should be taken and all effects discounted Auto O&M costs are understated (DeLucht, Sperhng, and Johnston, 1987) , which could lead to the underprovls~on of transit
The 1986 gmdehnes do not change the basic nature of the 1984 method, but introduce several ~mprove-ments that will make ~t easier to use efficiency analysis m the future
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Methods of evaluating transtt proposals have ~m-proved m the Umted States dunng the last 10 years The UMTA review procedures now describe economic effioency as the desirable theoretical basts for evaluatmn and d~scuss possible benefit-cost anal~s~s methods that could be used (UMTA, 1986) The agency, however, rejects the use ot these techmques in the actual evaluatton framework because ~t beheves that the problems of quantlficatmn are too great (UMTA, 1984a , UMTA, 1986 ) Some concepts of welfare economics are used by UMTA, though ProJects are evaluated at the margin and the various criteria enunciated by Congress have been collapsed into one measure of merit so that projects can be ranked unambiguously (UMTA, 1984) The wllhngness-to-pay of riders is now a recommended supplemental measure (UMTA, 1986) Also, many definmons and measures of benefts and costs have been standardized These recently adopted and recommended conventions of analysis make ~t easier to progress to a policy analysis method m which efficiency is measured, as well as other effects
The current UMTA method incorporates some useful policy analysis concepts that can lead to tradeoff anaIys~s Nonperformance information is incorporated into decision making m a second analysis step, and can affect project rankmgs, within set hmits This is a useful framework that allows for the use of noneconomic information
The current method acknowledges uncertainty in the regulations, but does not properly consider uncertainty in actual evaluations, which results m unsound distractions being created among projects Many transportation planners retreated from beneflt--cost methods m the 1960s because of the mcreased range of ~mpacts being evaluated With improvements in methods that have occurred in the last 20 years, however, ~t seems that efficiency measures can be used to encompass most of the effects now being evaluated and we can return to an analysis framework that includes efficiency measures as its mare element This is what many major federal agencies now do m evaluating plans and projects with very complex effects
Recommendations
First, UMTA evaluates rail projects at the margin against TSM, but does not reqmre TSM to occur, even if it is more cost-effectwe This is a serious problem UMTA needs to require TSM whenever tt ts more cost-effecuve than rad prolects Later, when efficiency measures are used. TSM should hkewlse be reqmred when it is shown to be efficient When TSM ts not required, prolects should be evaluated agamst the status quo
The second problem is using a cost-effectweness measure as the most important indicator of merit, instead of using a measure of economic efficiency UMTA should employ benefit-cost methods that include redirect costs and benefits to the mammum extent that is feastble We beheve that UMTA underestimates the practicality of doing this Third, once efficiency effects are measured in a fairly broad way, that is pollution, congestion, and other major redirect effects are monetized, tradeoffs with noneconomic effects can be evaluated Such an analytical framework will allow decision makers to compare projects m a way that permits them to see the economic costs of the other values being obtained UMTA should use a tradeoff analysts method R A JOHNSTON and M A DELUCHI to assist m the valuation of the noneconomtc effects ofpro]ects We believe that many important effects. such as reductions m air pollution, can be valued m efficiency terms, and so the tradeoff analysis step would have to show the breakeven economic worth of only a few types of impacts, such as d~stribuuonal eqmty and other locally identified noneconomic impacts
The fourth major problem is with uncertainty and bias UMTA uses the local projections for the estimates of effects Apparently, UMTA sends consultants to candidate c~ties to review the financial cost prolectmns, but it is unclear if th~s is a regular practice It is also unclear ff UMTA checks the other estimates carefuliy Ridershtp projectmns tend to be Mgh, as we noted above O&M cost projections tend to be low, as Wachs and Ortner (1979) and Johnston et al (1987) have observed It is as though Congress allowed local water districts to perform their own project evaluations of proposed Army Corps dams UMTA shouM be funded to perform the evaluations or at least to thoroughly check the local estimates Progress has been made in methods of evaluating transit projects m the United States UMTA now needs to go one step farther and make use of economic effciency analysis methods in a pohcy analysis framework Considerable experience has been gamed by the other federal agencies that use such a method and transit agencies can learn from these studies Improved transit evaluatmn methods can lead to a more efficient allocation of federal funds and a more explicit awareness of the value of noneconomic impacts tn decimon making
